Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability and the Demise of the Consumer Expectations Test by Korzec, Rebecca
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 20 | Issue 2 Article 2
8-1-1997
Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products
Liability and the Demise of the Consumer
Expectations Test
Rebecca Korzec
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rebecca Korzec, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability and the Demise of the Consumer
Expectations Test, 20 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 227 (1997), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/
vol20/iss2/2
Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products 
Liability and the Demise of the Consumer 
Expectations Test 
1Zebecca }(orzec* 
INTRODUCTION 
The threshold issue in American products liability litigation is 
whether the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer's 
controLI Traditionally, courts and scholars define "defect" in three 
functional categories: manufacturing defects, design defects and mar-
keting defects.2 American products liability doctrine employs two major 
tests to determine whether a "defect" exists: the seller-oriented risk-util-
ity test and the buyer-oriented consumer expectations test. 3 The Draft 
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
1 See, e.g., David Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974); 
see also Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Ore. 1974) ("Courts continue to 
flounder while attempting to determine how one decides whether a product is in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user."). Cf Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 
740 (N.Y 1995) (Simons,]., dissenting: "[T]he word 'defect' has no clear legal meaning."). 
2 A manufacturing defect is "an abnormality of a condition that was unintended, and makes 
the product more dangerous than it would have been as intended." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984). A design defect occurs 
when the product is manufactured according to the intended design, but the design poses 
unintended, unreasonable dangers. Seejames A. Henderson, jr., judicial Review of Manufacturers' 
Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1543 (1973) 
[hereinafter Henderson, judicial Review]. Professor Keeton describes marketing defect in terms 
of failure to warn: "A manufacturer or other seller is subject to liability for failing to warn or 
adequately to warn about a risk or hazard inherent in the way a product is designed .... " KEETON 
ET AL., supra, § 96, at 685. 
3 See james A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Tarts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1532-33 (1992) [hereinafter Henderson 
& Twerski, A Proposed Revision]. The risk-utility and consumer expectations tests are alternative 
tests for determining strict liability for defective products under § 402A of the Restatement 2d of 
Torts. See Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So.2d 248, 252 (Miss. 1993). The Supreme Court 
of Mississippi compared the two tests as follows: 
[I]n a "consumer expectations" analysis, for a plaintiff to recover, the defect in a product 
which causes his injuries must not be one which the plaintiff, as an ordinary consumer, 
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of the Restatement Third of Torts: Products Liability, like some Ameri-
can jurisdictions, rejects the "consumer expectations" test as an inde-
pendent standard in defective warning and design cases.4 Ironically, 
this limitation of the use of the consumer expectations test in American 
products liability doctrine5 coincides with the European Community's6 
would know to be unreasonably dangerous to him. In other words, if the plaintiff, 
applying the knowledge of an ordinary consumer, sees a danger and can appreciate that 
danger, then he cannot recover for any injury resulting from that appreciated dan-
ger .... In a "risk-utility" analysis, a product is "unreasonably dangerous" if a reasonable 
person would conclude that the danger-in-fact, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs 
the utility of the product. 
Id: at 254. 
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Preliminary Draft No.3, 1996); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No.2, 1995); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Preliminary Draft No.1, 1993) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT DRAFT). On September 17, 1993, the reporters, Professors James Henderson and 
Aaron Twerski, released Council Draft No.1, which differs slightly from Preliminary Draft No.1. 
Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Council Draft No.1, 1993) with 
RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra. Tentative Drafts Nos. 2 and 3 were prepared for submission to the 
members of the American Law Institute at its annual meetings on May 16-19, 1995 and May 
14-17, 1996, respectively. Tentative Drafts remain tentative until the final publication is author-
ized. The bylaws of the American Law Institute provide that: "Publication of any work as repre-
senting the Institute's position requires authorization by the membership and approval by the 
Council." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 73RD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE: 
PROCEEDINGS 1996, at 554 (1997). 
Professor Marshall Shapo refers to the Restatement Third approach to the consumer expecta-
tions test as "[A) lamentable defect in the reporters' analysis .... " Marshall S. Shapo, In Search 
of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REv. 631, 665 (1995) 
[hereinafter Shapo, In Search of the Law). Essentially, the Restatement Third approach concludes 
that the risk-utility test is the main approach for determining product defectiveness. The reporters 
argue that "consumer expectations do not constitute an independent standard for judging the 
defectiveness of product designs." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, cmt. f; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. I, 1994). This leaves the 
consumer expectations test available in manufacturing defect cases, such as contaminated food. 
See RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra, § 3. The reporters conclude that unlike defective design or 
defective marketing cases, defective manufacture cases require a finding that the product fails 
"to function as a reasonable person could expect it to function." Id. At least four commentators 
have concluded that the reporters' position that most jurisdictions reject the consumer expecta-
tions test, except in manufacturing defect cases, is simply inaccurate. See Roland F. Banks & 
Margaret O'Connor, Restating the Restatement (Second), Section 402A-Design Defect, 72 OR. L. 
REV. 411, 415-20 (1993); Howard F. Klemme, Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members of 
the Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1173, 
1173-76 (1994); Shapo, In Search of the Law, supra, at 666; John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New 
Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a 'New Cloth' for Section 402A Products Liability Design 
Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 493, 518-19 (1996). 
5 RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 4, §§ 101, 103. 
6 The European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU) when the Treaty on 
European Union, otherwise known as the Maastricht Treaty, came into force in November, 1993. 
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adoption of the consumer-oriented test for European strict products 
liability cases.7 
This article analyzes these contemporary developments. First, it con-
siders the implications of the European Union's (EU) Council Direc-
tive No. 85/374 (European Directive) for American products liability 
law. It then analyses the consumer expectations test in light of the 
purpose of products liability law. Reconsideration of the consumer 
expectations test suggests that, properly constructed and applied, the 
consumer-oriented test promotes considerations of safety, equity, and 
efficiency. 
I. THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE AND AMERICAN 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 
A. Strict Liability and Consumer Expectations 
As the EU moves toward implementation of strict liability for defec-
tive products, American products liability law is reevaluating its legal 
and social significance.8 Like most laws, strict products liability embod-
ies a codification of social policy.9 As between the manufacturer who 
brings the product to market and the buyer who uses it as intended, 
who is more responsible for the product? Who is in the better financial 
position to pay for product injuries? Strict liability theory places these 
costs on the manufacturer even though he or she is without fault or 
See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 224) 1, [1992] 1 
C.M.L.R. 573 (1992). For purposes of consistency, both the European Union and the pre-Maas-
tricht Treaty European Community will be referred to as the European Union. 
7 See Council Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations 
and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 
arts. 1,6(1), 28 OJ. (L 210) 29,30-31 [hereinafter 1985 European Directive]. On July 25,1985, 
the EU adopted a uniform products liability directive. See id.; see generally Marshall S. Shapo, 
Comparing Products Liability: Concepts in European and American Law, 26 CORNELL INT'L. LJ. 279 
(1993); Jean Stapleton, Products Liability Reform-Real or Illusory?, 6 Ox. ]. LEG. STUD. 392 
(1986). 
H See, e.g., David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 
1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 743 (1996) [hereinafter Owen, Defectiveness Restated]; William Powers, Jr., A 
Modest Proposal To Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 639 (1991); Angela C. 
Rushton, Design Defects Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reassessment of Strict Liability and 
the Goals of a Functional Approach, 45 EMORY LJ. 389 (1996); Shapo, In Search of the Law, supra 
note 4. 
9 See, e.g., VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
(1995); Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability (Pt. II: Manufacturers), 34 TEX. L. REv. 192,227-28 
(1955); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual 
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14]. LEG. STUD. 461 (1985) [hereinafter Priest, The Invention]. 
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liability under traditional negligence or warranty concepts. lO Even the 
non-negligent manufacturer is morally responsible since he or she 
designed, tested and manufactured the product; he or she placed it 
into the marketplaceY From an economic point of view, strict liability 
makes two assumptions. First, the manufacturer made a profit from a 
particular product, and on all similar products sold.12 Second, if the 
manufacturer pays for the damages caused by his or her product, he 
or she can pass the costs on to the consuming public through higher 
pricesP Spreading the cost created by a relatively small number of 
defective products across the cost of all units sold should result in only 
minor price increases to the consuming public.14 
Strict products liability is designed to promote both safety and fair-
ness. 15 In fact, the original purpose for adopting strict products liabil-
ity was to relieve the injured consumer from the enormous burdens 
of proving either negligence or the overly technical requirements of 
warranty.16The primary rationale behind this doctrine is that, since the 
manufacturer profits from product sales, he or she should pay for any 
damage caused by that product. 17 Paying for accidents becomes a cost 
of doing business. IS In theory, only products which generate profits 
10 See Priest, The Invention, supra note 9, at 505; see also George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: 
The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 2301 (1989) [hereinafter Priest, Original Intent). For a 
critique of Priest's analysis, see David G. Owen, The Intellectual Development of Modern Products 
Liability Law: A Comment on Priest's View of the Cathedral's Foundations, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 529 
(1989) [hereinafter Owen, Intellectual Development); Gary Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible 
End of the Rise of Modern Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601 (1992). 
11 See, e.g., John Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian Approach to 
Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REv. 677 (1988). 
12 See John E. Montgomery & David G. Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of 
Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REv. 803, 809-10 (1976). 
13 Id.; see also MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS 72, 75-77 (1995). 
14 See Montgomery & Owen, supra note 12, at 808-10. Critiques of the traditional policy 
arguments include Sheila Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to 
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1980); Priest, The Invention, supra 
note 9; Alan Schwartz, Products Liability and Judicial Wealth Redistributions, 51 IND. LJ. 558 
(1976). 
15 See, e.g., Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976); see generally John W. 
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. LJ. 825 (1973) [hereinafter 
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability). 
16 See Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435, 459-61 
(1979). 
17 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi &Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Testfor Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE 
LJ. 1055 (1972). 
18 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962) ("The purpose of 
[strict) liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne 
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after all true production costs, including safety costs, are paid will 
remain on the market. 19 Under a true strict liability regime, recovery 
depends neither on manufacturer fault nor negligence, but on the 
manufacturer's responsibility for the product which caused "injury."2o 
In this sense, the manufacturer bears ultimate responsibility for prod-
uct safety.21 
Criticizing strict liability doctrine for failing, in an efficient way, to 
produce safe products ignores the issue of moral responsibility.22 Ad-
mittedly, strict liability may make manufacturers more careful, thereby 
creating safer products. 23 Such product safety, however, complements 
the predominate goal: assuring that manufacturers pay the actual costs 
of product injuries.24 The only significant inquiry for strict liability 
analysis is who should pay these costS.25 Clearly, accident costs not paid 
by the manufacturer necessarily fall on the injured party.26 As between 
the manufacturer, who places the defective product on the market, and 
the injured party, the manufacturer should bear the immediate, direct 
financial responsibility.27 Ultimately, consumers as a whole underwrite 
the cost of product injury in the loss-spreading price increases passed 
on to them by the manufacturer.28 As a result, the market price of a 
by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons 
who are powerless to protect themselves."); W. Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of 
Defect, 5 ST. MARY's LJ. 30, 35 (1973) ("A fourth and perhaps major reason ordinarily given for 
strict liability in this area is that those engaged in the manufacturing enterprise can serve 
effectively as risk distributors accepting responsibility for accident losses attributable to the 
dangerousness of products as a cost of doing business."). 
19 See Richard Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 209-12 (1973). Cf Gary 
T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA 
L. REV. 377 (1994). 
20 See generally Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). 
21 See, e.g., Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900; McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 
1967); see generally Alan Schwartz, Pmposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 
97 YALE LJ. 353 (1988) [hereinafter Schwartz, Proposals for Reform]. 
22 See generally David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward Jilrst 
Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 427 (1993) [hereinafter Owen, Moral Foundations]. 
23 See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability, supra note 15, at 866; see also GUIDO CALABRESI, 
THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 73 (1970). 
24 See, e.g., David G. Owen, Musings on Modern Products Liability Law: A Foreword, 17 SETON 
HALL L. REv. 505 (1987). 
25 See Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 22, at 429-30 (1993). 
26 See Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. 
L. REv. 363, 375 (1965). 
27 See, e.g., Gary Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL 
L. REv. 313 (1990). 
2H See, e.g., Traynor, supra note 26, at 366. 
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product reflects the true cost of that product, including accident 
costS.29 
Examination of the historical underpinnings of strict products liabil-
ity reveals that the original § 402A possesses a decidedly pro-consumer 
orientation.3o Strict liability for defective products was intended to 
relieve the injured' consumer from the burdensome requirements of 
proving either negligence or breach of warranty.31 Historically, the 
consumer expectations test is the natural, logical result of strict prod-
ucts liability as the extension of implied warranty law.32 Recognition of 
the protection of reasonable consumer product safety expectations 
essentially dictates the adoption of the consumer expectations test.33 
B. The European Directive and the Consumer Expectations Test 
The European approach to consumer expectations owes much to 
American products liability doctrine. In turn, it can be a corrective 
reminder that reasonable consumer expectations have a central posi-
tion in products liability analysis. In part, the European Directive 
resulted from the demand for product safety following the thalidomide 
tragedy in Europe during the 1960s.34 An additional reason for its 
implementation was the need to harmonize the differing national rules 
for products liability for economic reasons. A single strict liability 
29 See, e.g., David Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681 (1980) 
[hereinafter Owen, Rethinking the Policies]. 
30 See generally Priest, Original Intent, supra note 10. 
31 See Priest, The Invention, supra note 9, at 508-09. q Owen, Intellectual Development, supra 
note 10. 
32 See Fischer, supra note 1, at 348. 
Id. 
Many courts have used consumer expectations as a criteria for defining defect. If a 
consumer reasonably expects a product to be safe to use for a purpose, the product is 
defective if it does not meet those expectations. The consumer expectations test is 
natural since strict liability in tort developed from the law of warranty. The law of implied 
warranty is vitally concerned with protecting justified expectations since this is a funda-
mental policy of the law of contracts. 
33 See Michael D. Bernacchi, A Behavioral Model for Imposing Strict Liability in Tort: The Impor-
tance of Analyzing Product Performance in Relation to Consumer Expectation and Frustration, 47 U. 
CIN. L. REv. 43, 49-50 (1978); F. Patrick Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative 
Model for Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REv. 465, 467-84 (1978); 
John Neely Kennedy, The Role of the Consumer Expectation Test Under Louisiana's Products Liability 
Tort Doctrine, 69 TUL. L. REv. 117, 139-42 (1994). 
34 See Ferdinando Albanese & Louis F. Del Duca, Developments in European Product Liability, 5 
DICK.]. INT'L. L. 193, 193-94 (1987); Kathleen M. Nilles, Note, Defining the Limits of Liability: A 
Legal and Political Analysis of the European Community Products Liability Directive, 25 VA.]. INT'L. 
L. & COM. 155 (1986). 
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regime would place all twelve Member States on an equal footing, 
eliminating the risk that consumers would receive differing amounts 
of protection or that producers in Member States having stricter re-
gimes would be financially disadvantaged. 35 
Before the European Directive, the products liability laws of the 
individual Member States varied greatly. Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain maintained traditional negligence systems with the plaintiff re-
taining the traditional burden of proof.36 Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Ireland and the United Kingdom had a presumption of 
liability shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, which resem-
bled strict liability.37 Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg had absolute 
strict liability regimes.38 
Implementation of the European Directive by the Member States was 
slow and uneven. For example, Germany eventually enacted the Prod-
uct Liability Act of 15 December 1989.39 It took some time for Germany 
to transform the European Directive because the German Government 
considered existing German law to have already met, if not exceeded, 
the goals of the European Directive.40 German courts had imposed 
strict liability for defective products by reversing the burden of proof 
in the famous Fowl Pes[ll case.42 
Article 6 of the European Directive provides: 
1. A product is defective when it does not provide the safety 
which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances 
into account, including: 
(a) the presentation of the product; 
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the 
product would be put; [and] 
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation. 
35 See Heinz]. Dielmann, The European Economic Community's Council Directive on Product 
Liamlity, 20 INT'L. LAw. 1391, 1391 (1986). 
36 See generally Albanese & Del Duca, supra note 34; Anita Bernstein & Paul Fanning, Heirs of 
Leonardo: Cultural Obstacles to Strict Products Liability in Italy, 27 VAND.]. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1994); 
Nadine E. Roddy, Strict Product Liamlity in Europe: The EEC and the Directive on Defective Products, 
12 PROD. LIAB. TRENDS 97 (1987). 
37 See generally Lord Griffiths et aI., English Product Liamlity Law, 62 TuL. L. REv. 353 (1988). 
38 See Frank A. Orban, III, Product Liability: A Comparative Legal Restatement-Foreign National 
Law and the EEC Directive, 8 GA.]. INT'L. & COMPo L. 342, 344 (1978); see generally HARRY 
DULINTER TEBBENS, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT LIABILITY (1979). 
39Produkthaftungsgesetz (ProdHaftG), v.1989 (Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI. I] S.2198) 
(F.R.G.). 
40 See NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LAW & LEGAL SYSTEM 144-46, 235-37 (1993). 
41 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 51,91. 
42 See Joachim Zekoll, The German Products Liamlity Act, 37 AM.]. COMPo L. 809, 810 (1989). 
234 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REvIEW [Vol. XX, No, 2 
2, A product shall not be considered defective for the sole 
reason that a better product is subsequently put into circula-
tion,43 
The European Directive imposes strict liability through its definition 
of "defect," Article 6(1) 's definition of defect is modeled on the con-
sumer expectations test of § 402A comment i to the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts,44 Comment i provides the basis of the consumer expec-
tation test by stating that a product is defective if it is "dangerous to 
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary 
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to 
the community as to its characteristics, "45 
43 1985 European Directive, supra note 7, art. 6. The key provisions of the European Directive 
present interesting similarities and differences with American law. A brief summary is useful. 
Article 1 places liability on the producer for damage caused by a defect in his or her product. 
See id. art. 1. Article 2 defines "product" in terms of moveable items. See id. art. 2. This provision 
is analogous to the Uniform Commercial Code definition of "goods" in Article 2-105. See u.c.c. 
§ 2-105 (1994). 
Article 3 defines "producer" as: (a) the manufacturer of the finished product; (b) the producer 
of a component or raw material; or (c) one who holds himself or herself to be the product 
manufacturer by, for example, placing his or her name or trademark on the product. See 1985 
European Directive, supra note 7, art. 3. In addition, the importer of a product is deemed to be 
a producer if the imported product is placed into distribution in the ordinary course of business. 
See id. If the actual manufacturer cannot be identified, Article 3 requires that each seller be 
treated as the producer unless he or she indicates the name of the actual manufacturer and that 
manufacturer is subject to local jurisdiction. See id. If the product is imported, the seller may 
avoid liability by indicating the name of the importer. See id. Article 4 requires proof of causation. 
See id. art. 4. Article 5 adopts joint and several liability. See 1985 European Directive, supra note 
7, art. 5. Article 6 defines the defect in terms of the consumer expectations test. See id. art. 6. 
The defect must exist at the time the product was placed into commerce by the producer. See id. 
In addition, a product may be defective in its "presentations," which includes packaging, labeling 
and directions for use. See id. Therefore, failure to warn of potential dangers will be actionable. 
See id. The language of the European Directive strongly parallels the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts. Compare 1985 European Directive, supra note 7, art. 6 with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1964). Comment i to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides 
that: "the article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated 
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the com-
munity as to its characteristics." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1964). 
Article 7 establishes producer defenses. See 1985 European Directive, supra note 7, art. 7. An 
earlier draft had excluded "development risks" or a "state of the art" defense, as it is called in 
American products liability law. See id. However, Article 7(e) of the European Directive allows 
such a defense. See id. art. 7(e). "State of the art" generally refers to scientific knowledge available 
at a particular time. Article 15 permits the elimination of the state of the art defense. See id. art. 
15. In most American jurisdictions, this defense is available in failure to warn cases. 
44 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1964). 
45/d. Professor Marshall Shapo argues that the European Directive "pr~jects a conception of 
strict liability that is, if anything, more extensive and consumer biased than virtually any American 
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The attempt by the EU to harmonize the products liability law of the 
Member States should inform the American national debate on prod-
ucts liability. The European Directive recognizes that defective prod-
ucts can cause extensive harm to individual consumers.46 Without the 
European Directive, however, the legal position of an injured person 
varies according to the legal standards of the individual Member 
StatesY The European Directive establishes one standard, strict liabil-
ity, as the common denominator for consumer product safety.48 Sig-
nificantly, it also adopts the consumer expectations test as the standard 
for determining product safety.49 
Much of the scholarly criticism heaped on the American consumer 
expectations test might be avoided by focusing on what the consumer 
is entitled to expect, rather than on what the particular user actually 
knows or expects in either a literal or idiosyncratic sense. Once the 
emphasis is on the consumer's entitlement to certain product safety 
expectations, the consumer-oriented standard becomes quite work-
able. The consumer could establish the entitled expectation from a 
number of sources, including the following: (a) manufacturer's repre-
sentations;50 (b) governmental safety regulations;51 (c) industry stand-
ards and guidelines; (d) information in the public domain; or (e) 
general community information concerning products.52 Expert testi-
mony would be permitted or, in some cases, even required, to demon-
strate the standard of entitlement under this consumer expectation 
test.53 
state jurisprudence. . . . Its most salient feature is the strength of the desire for consumer 
protection reflected in its overall architecture." Shapo, In Search of the Law, supra note 4, at 650. 
46 See Giulio Ponzanelli, The European Community Directive on Products Liability, in TORT LAW 
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 238, 241 (Peter H. Shuck ed., 1991). 
47 See id. at 239-41. 
48 See id. at 241. 
49 See id. 
50 See Leichthamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 578 (Ohio 1981) (safety repre-
sentations of jeep manufacturer encouraged consumer risk-taking). 
51 Government-mandated warnings concerning cigarettes and alcohol, for example, may in-
form the public generally, thereby creating expectations concerning safety. 
52 See Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1982) (alcohol is not an unreason-
ably dangerous product because the dangers of drinking alcohol are common knowledge). 
53 For example, experts in human factors engineering, psychology and communications have 
testified about the adequacy of warnings. See, e.g., Prevatt v. Pennwalt Corp., 237 Cal. Rptr. 488 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Long v. Deere & Co., 715 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1986); Smith v. United States 
Gypsum Co., 612 P.2d 251 (Okla. 1980); see generally William H. Hardie, Scare Tactics: Motivating 
Warning Compliance, PROD. LIAB. DAILY (BNA) (Sept. 12, 1995), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, 
BNAPLD File. 
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The importance of this consumer-oriented approach is that it estab-
lishes the consumer viewpoint as the starting point for product liability 
analysis. This is more than a matter of mere semantics. Historically, 
reasonable consumer safety concerns have been and should remain 
the primary concern of products liability law.54 Economic concerns 
should have only secondary significance.55 At a minimum, consumers 
are entitled to an expectation that manufacturers, as experts in the 
field, will sell products which are as safe as possible, given technological 
and scientific feasibility. 56 At the same time, consumers are not entitled 
to expect product safety if harm is caused by product uses or misuses 
which the consumer knows or should have known to be unreasonably 
dangerous. 57 
Defect and consumer use issues must be determined according to 
the state of the art, that is, the scientific and technological knowledge 
available at the time the product is marketed.58 To a significant extent, 
this approach recognizes that the product user and the product pro-
ducer have reciprocal obligations concerning product safety.59 In other 
words, if the product defect actually causes a safety hazard, product 
manufacturers should be held responsible for foreseeable harm unex-
pected by consumers.60 However, product users ought to be held re-
54 See generally William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liamlity to the Consumer), 50 
MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966). 
55 See, e.g., Shapo, In Search of the Law, supra note 4. 
56 See, e.g., Oscar S. Gray, The Draft AU Product Liamlity Proposals: Progress or Anachronism?, 
61 TENN. L. REV. 1105 (1994);Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles Hee~ 61 TENN. L. REv. 1265 (1994). 
57 See TEBBENS, supra note 38, at 150. 
Id. 
The meaning of the qualification "is entitled to expect" constitutes another "moral 
datum," to use Ehrenzweig's term. The Strasbourg Report observes only that the expec-
tations may be higher than mere observance of statutory rules; the EC Memorandum 
is silent on this point. Again one looks for a yard-stick in determining what will make 
expectations legitimate (the French text renders this normative element by using "le-
gitimement"). Perhaps the main criterion is what representations the producer has 
made, e.g., in publications and directions for use, in short the product's presentation 
as referred to in the Strasbourg Convention. 
58 See John W. Wade, On the E-JJect in Product Liamlity of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Market-
ing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 750-51 (1983). State of the art is termed "development risks" under 
Article 7 of the European Directive. 1985 European Directive, supra note 7, art. 7. 
59 See generally David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REv. 703 (1992) [hereinafter Owen, The 
Fault Pitl; David G. Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (David G. Owen ed., 1995). 
60 See generally David G. Owen, Products Liability Principles of justice, 20 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 
238 (1991). 
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sponsible for injuries resulting from product uses which they recognize 
or should recognize to create unreasonably dangerous risks. 61 
These reciprocal safety responsibilities are promoted by the prevail-
ing consumer-oriented test employed in manufacturing defect cases.62 
Despite a manufacturer's non-negligent efforts and the reasonableness 
of these efforts, production errors can cause accidents.53 Even if a 
manufacturer could demonstrate that he or she had exercised the 
highest possible care, societal attitudes have evolved to create the 
expectation that consumers are entitled to expect basic physical integ-
rity in products: the soda pop bottle should not explode; food should 
not be contaminated.64 Reasonable consumer expectations are pro-
tected in part because the consumer is entitled to the basic product 
safety for which he or she pays.65 Consumer autonomy is preserved by 
the current approach.66 
Some scholars argue that application of this consumer-oriented 
analysis to warning and design cases is unworkable and ineffective.67 
Focusing on reasonable consumer entitlement to expectations, rather 
than idiosyncratic knowledge, becomes crucial. Although design deci-
sions cannot be expected to ensure absolute product safety, it is, nev-
ertheless, essential to use consumer expectancy as the starting point of 
analysis. If the focus is on the safety the consumer is entitled to expect, 
the determination of entitlement necessarily takes into account the 
product design, including directions and warnings, technologically 
and scientifically possible at the time of manufacture.6R Reasonable 
product users would not believe they are entitled to have manufactur-
ers pay for their negligent or unforeseeable conduct in using prod-
uctS. 69 Similarly, reasonable consumers would not believe that manu-
61 See generally Joseph W. Little, The Place of Consumer Expectations in Product Strict Liamlity 
Actions for Defectively Designed Products, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1189 (1994); see also General Motors v. 
Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex. 1977) ("We cannot charge the manufacturers ofa knife when 
it is used as a toothpick .... "). 
62 See Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 22, at 429-30. 
63 See Howard Klemme, The Enterprise Liamlity of Torts, 47 COLO. L. REv. 153, 191-92 (1976). 
64 See, e.g., Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 420 P.2d 855 (Nev. 1966) (decomposed 
mouse in bottle of "Squirt" soda). 
65 See, e.g., Thomas A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1077 
(1965). 
66 See Phillips, supra note 56, at 1273. 
67 See James A. Henderson,Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Will a New Restatement Help Settle Troubled 
Waters?, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1257, 1264 (1993). 
68 See Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liamlity: The Empire 
Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1183, 1197-98 (1992). 
69 The user's contributory negligence will bar recovery in strict liability in tort provided this 
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facturers could produce products beyond the safety possible under the 
scientific and technological knowledge available at the time of product 
design and manufacture.7o 
Professor James Henderson argues that the consumer expectations 
test permits the marketplace to decide the degree of safety which 
should be designed into the product. 7! In applying the consumer 
expectations test to design defects, courts do not evaluate the design 
itself.72 Instead, courts require manufacturers to fully disclose product 
risks so as to permit consumers to make informed decisions about the 
amount of product safety to purchase.73 If the consuming public wants 
certain safety features, manufacturers will respond to market de-
mands. 74 On the other hand, products with too many safety features 
will not sell, ultimately driving them from the market. 75 
As a result, the consumer-oriented test might prove quite effective 
in design cases.76 Admittedly, courts may not be equipped to evaluate 
the complicated scientific data inherent in product design choices. If 
courts cannot develop and apply meaningful design standards, ulti-
mately cases will be decided by the whim of individual juries.77 Such 
inconsistent jury verdicts promote neither safety nor efficiency. Never-
theless, employing a risk-utility balancing test does not insure that 
every jury will reach the same design conclusion about the effective-
ness of a particular product. 78 Redesigning complex products accord-
ing to the whims of conflicting jury decisions is unworkable. 79 However, 
negligence is the sole proximate cause of injury. See, e.g., Yun v. Ford Motor Co., 647 A.2d 841 
(NJ. App. Div. 1994); see generally Aaron Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring 
Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1974). 
70 See, e.g., Little, supra note 61, at 1201-03. 
71 See Henderson, judicial Review, supra note 2, at 1560-62. 
72 See Fischer, supra note 1, at 348 ("Many courts have used consumer expectations as a criteria 
for defining defect. If a consumer reasonably expects a product to be safe to use for a purpose, 
the product is defective if it does not meet this expectation."). 
73 See, e.g, Howard Latin, Good Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. 
REv. 1193 (1994). 
74 Safety devices on circular saws are a common example. See, e.g., Verne L. Roberts, Circular 
Saw Design: A Hazard Analysis, 1 J. PROD. LIAB. 127 (1977). 
75 See Henderson, judicial Review, supra note 2, at 1558-62. 
76 Some jurisdictions continue to employ the consumer expectations test as the primary test of 
defect. See, e.g., Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1982); Woods v. Fruehauf Trailer 
Corp., 765 P.2d 770 (Okla. 1988); see also Note, The Consumer Expectations Test in New jersey: What 
Can Consumers Expect Now?, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 1381 (1989). 
77 See Henderson, judicial Review, supra note 2, at 1558. 
78 See David Epstein, The Risks of Risk Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L. REV. 469, 475-76 (1987). 
79 This argument often arises in automobile crashworthiness or enhanced injury litigation. See, 
e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981). 
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this concern is an issue of process or procedure rather than the result 
of employing a particular definition of product defect.so 
Similar arguments apply to defective marketing or failure to warn 
cases. If warnings and instructions are overly detailed, increasing prod-
uct price without corresponding safety improvement, consumers even-
tually will refuse to pay for this "unnecessary" safety. 81 On the other 
hand, if additional warnings and instructions result in useful safety 
information, consumers may be willing to bear the expense.82 In this 
sense, stronger warnings complement stronger product designs.83 
Ultimately, the manufacturer is responsible for producing a safe 
product, while the consumer is responsible for using that product 
safely. If the consumer expectations standard is viewed from this enti-
tlement perspective, the standard requires the product user to be 
responsible for harm resulting from product uses falling below the 
norm to be expected of reasonable product safety.84 Some scholars 
argue that products liability law should not entertain arguments con-
cerning consumer user responsibility, because "contributory negli-
gence" principles have no place in strict liability analysis.85 However, 
consumer expectations about safety entitlement demand that individ-
ual consumers, rather than manufacturers or the entire consuming 
population, be responsible for their own errors and risk-taking in using 
products.86 Moreover, in cases in which responsibility for the product 
accident is shared by both the manufacturer and the consumer, com-
parative fault principles should apply.87 
80 The exploration of these procedural issues is beyond the purview of this article. However, 
areas to be looked at include expanded review of the role of the judge in keeping questionable 
cases from the jury, alternative dispute resolution, and expert panels. 
81 See, e.g., Rebecca K. Phillips, Crashworthiness in the Commonwealth: An Analysis of the Defec-
tiveness of Tractors Without ROPS, 23 N. Ky. L. REv. 325 (1996) (considering whether a litigant 
can establish a cause of action in Kentucky against the manufacturer of a tractor lacking rollover 
protection devices (ROPS»; see gmerally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
175-86 (4th ed. 1972). 
82 See generally David M. Grether et aI., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of 
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 277 (1986). 
8~ See, e.g., Shea Sullivan, Football Helmet Product Liability: A Survey oj Cases and Call Jor ReJorm, 
3 SPORTS LAW J. 233 (1996); see also Schwartz, Proposals Jor ReJorm, supra note 21, at 396-98. 
84 See VICTOR SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 17-5 (3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter 
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGI.IGENCE]. 
8'> See Owen, Rethinking the Policies, supra note 29, at 710-711. 
86 See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision Jor Comparative 
Fault in Products Liability, 39 VILI .. L. REV. 281 (1994). 
87 See generally SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 84, at ch. 11. 
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II. THE CREATION OF CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS 
Product accidents occur because the manufacturer, the user, or both 
have imperfect knowledge about the product, its use and the user's 
level of knowledge.88 Both manufacturers and users have concrete 
expectations about both the ability of consumers to use products safely 
and the degree of safety responsibility attributable to manufacturers or 
consumers. In effect, then, the consuming public possesses basic ex-
pectations about both consumer norms of conduct and manufacturer 
safety responsibility.89 
To a significant degree, manufacturers create consumer safety ex-
pectations through product labeling and advertising.90 The manufac-
turer who makes false statements about his or her product (even 
though made non-negligently, or even innocently) creates legitimate 
and reasonable consumer expectations which merit protection.9! In 
effect, the manufacturer makes the statements to induce consumers to 
purchase the product.92 Safety information provided by the manufac-
turer is justifiably important to consumers.93 This is especially true 
when the harm created by the product defect creates a "surprise 
element of danger."94 Consumers reasonably rely on the manufac-
turer's expertise and integrity in making safety promises.95 Absent these 
promises, individual consumers might invest in independently obtain-
ing more product information.96 
Moreover, consumers actually pay for quality control or other safety-
assurance procedures in the product price.97 Consequently, manufac-
turers should be required to pay for false safety representations which 
cause injury.98 Anything less results in the consumer losing both the 
88 See generally Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 2. 
89 See Hubbard, supra note 33, at 484-91; Marshall Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer 
Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109 
(1974) [hereinafter Shapo, Representational Theory]. 
90 See Shapo, Representational Theory, supra note 89, at 1370. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. at 1370-71. 
94 See Traynor, supra note 26, at 370. 
95 See Shapo, Representational Theory, supra note 89, at 370-71. 
96 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distrilmtion and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE 
LJ. 499 (1961). 
97 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hawson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for 
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REv. 683 (1993). 
98 See St. Joseph Hasp. v. Corbetta Constr. Co., 316 N.E.2d 51, 70-71 (Ill. App. 1974). 
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benefits of his or her bargain and his or her bargaining autonomy.99 
Therefore, all manufacturer product representations, including labels 
and advertisements, should be considered in determining the safety 
expectations to which the consumer is entitled.lOo 
Consumers also have a generalized understanding that governmen-
tal regulations mandate consumer safety. 101 The media and governmen-
tal entities, as well as manufacturers, may disseminate information 
about such governmental regulations,102 as well as voluntarily adopted 
industry standards. 103 Clearly, the manufacturer's affirmative obligation 
to provide consumers with product information which warns of dan-
gers or instructs about safe use depends on the general availability of 
this information. l04 If such information is already known to the reason-
able consumer, there is no reason for the manufacturer to provide it. 
However, if the information is not known, or if the defect which creates 
harm is latent or hidden, the manufacturer should warn consumers. lOS 
Consumers are entitled to such information because they reasonably 
expect manufacturers will discover foreseeable product risks and will 
warn consumers about them. 106 
The issue of presumed knowledge creates troublesome issues for this 
consumer-oriented analysis. Even if product risks are neither known 
nor discoverable, given the state of the art (scientific and technological 
knowledge) at the time of sale, allocation of responsibility for resulting 
accidents can still be assigned from a consumer expectation view-
99 See Shapo, Representational Theory, supra note 89, at 1109. 
looId. 
101 The general public sees examples of governmental regulation in everyday life. For example, 
prescription drugs and medical devices are extensively regulated by the FDA, pursuant to the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, originally enacted in 1932. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 
(1994). Some drug warnings must be provided directly to consumers. See, e.g., Patient Package 
Inserts for Oral Contraceptives, 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (1995) (requiring package inserts for oral 
con traceptives) . 
102 See, e.g., The National Highway Traffic & Safety Administration Authorization Act of 1991, 
49 U.S.C. §§ 30117-30121 (1994); see also The Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.c. § 1191 (1994); 
The Federal Hazardous Substance Act of 1970,15 U.S.C. § 1272 (1994); The Poison Prevention 
Packaging Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1472 (1994); The Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2054-
2055 (1994). 
103 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 127 (1991). 
104 See, e.g., Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the 'Right to Know' from the 'Need 
to Know' about Consumer Hazards, 11 YALE]. ON REG. 293 (1994). 
105 See Shapo, Representational Theory, supra note 89, at 1153-55. 
106 See James A. Henderson, Coping With the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. 
REv. 919, 939-49 (1981). 
242 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XX, No.2 
point. 107 Unlike the previously discussed situations in which the manu-
facturer affirmatively makes representations of product safety, the 
manufacturer now remains silent. lOS Arguably, such silence cannot cre-
ate false expectations of product safety, unless it is assumed that con-
sumers believe, and are entitled to believe, the false concept that all 
product risks are discoverable prior to marketing. 109 
Nevertheless, the manufacturer still profits at the expense of the 
injured consumer from a product containing unknowable or undis-
coverable product defectsYo As a result, it may be inherently equitable 
to force the manufacturer to pay even for such undiscoverable product 
risks.1ll Since the manufacturer profits from the product, he or she 
should pay the entire cost of producing that product, including acci-
dent costs.ll2 Moreover, the consumer cannot discover these unknow-
able or undiscoverable risks either. 113 
On the other hand, consumer expectations may be quite different. 
Consumers know that the world contains many unknown or undis-
coverable dangers and that those who seek the benefits of innovative 
products may encounter such riskS. I14 For example, the media informs 
consumers on an almost daily basis of newly discovered side effects of 
over-the-counter and prescription drugs. Consumers generally want 
the benefits of scientific and technological advancements, and realize 
that unknowable risks might be encountered. 1l5 Therefore, the con-
sumer harmed by an unknowable product design defect may not be 
entitled to an expectation of safety. I 16 
107 See generally Wertheimer, supra note 68. 
108 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The 
Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 273-78 (1990). 
109 See id.; see also Owen, Rethinking the Policies, supra note 29, at 703-07. 
110 See Beshada v.Johns-Manvilie Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547 (N]. 1982) (imposing manu-
facturer liability for failure to warn of unknowable risks of asbestosis advances strict liability). 
Beshada was the subject of considerable criticism. See, e.g., Symposium, The Passage of Time: The 
Implications for Product Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 733, 751 (1983). The New Jersey Supreme 
Court refused to apply Beshada to prescription drugs in Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 
388 (N]. 1984). 
III See Beshada, 447 A.2d at 547; see also Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against 
Comment K and for Strict Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 853, 891 (1983) ("Both the justification of 
justifiable expectations on the part of product victims and the achievement of modest advances 
in safety justifY the application of strict liability to harm from unknowable generic hazards."). 
112 See Beshada, 447 A.2d at 547. 
113 See id. at 548. 
114 See Birnbaum, supra note 14, at 604. 
115 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 475 (Cal. 1988) (finding prescription drugs 
"unavoidably unsafe" under comment K to § 402A). 
116Professor David G. Owen forcefully argues that permitting recovery for unknowable and 
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At the same time, manufacturing defects or flaws disappoint the very 
consumer expectations which consumers are entitled to expect (in 
large measure because the manufacturer expressly created those ex-
pectations), and which products liability law must therefore protect. 117 
Understandably, when the consumer purchases a product, he or she 
pays for its qualities, including safety, common to each product unit 
made according to the same design. liS In other words, the consumer 
is entitled to expect his or her product to be as safe as other units of 
that same product. 1I9 If the consumer receives a product with a dan-
gerous manufacturing flaw, his or her reasonable expectations are 
thwarted. At a minimum, consumers are entitled to expect that a 
product does not contain atypical flaws, and that it minimally meets 
the manufacturer's own specifications and requirements.120 
This focus on consumer expectations in manufacturing defect cases 
is equitable given the manufacturer's control of product safety.121 The 
manufacturer establishes the level of quality control, designs the prod-
uct, and generally possesses greater safety information.122 On the other 
hand, the consumer bears responsibility for actual product use. 123 For 
example, if the consumer chooses to use a product which is obviously 
dangerousl24 or if he or she uses the product in a highly unusual and 
undiscoverable product defects is immoral, violating the basic purpose of the tort system. See 
Owen, The Fault Pit, supra note 59, at 714-20. 
117 See Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1981) (product is 
defective if it fails to conform to manufacturer's specifications and promises). 
118 See generally Owen, Defectiveness Restated, supra note 8, at 751 (noting that section 2(a) of 
the Products Liability Restatement retains the consumer expectations test). 
119 See, e.g., Ducko v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 639 A.2d 1204, 1205-06 (Pa. Super. 1994) (mal-
function theory as complementary test for deviation from the norm). 
120 Commentators and courts agree that the manufacturing defect case presents the clearest 
and strongest case for applying both strict liability in tort and the consumer expectations test. See 
Fischer, supra note 1, at 348. Manufacturing defects exist when a product fails to meet the 
manufacturer's own specifications and quality control standards. See id. at 343. Two examples of 
manufacturing defects are flaws in the raw materials or component parts of a product, or an error 
in the assembly of component parts. Shortcomings in quality control might create such defects. 
The archetypical cases are the exploding soda bottle and the contaminated food or drink. 
The appropriateness of the consumer expectations test for manufacturing defects is almost 
universally acknowledged. See id. at 348. Reasonable consumer expectations clearly are defeated 
by a product which fails to meet the manufacturer's own standards. See id. 
121 See Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1971) (car manufacturer's 
negligent failure properly to tighten and inspect bolt in left rear suspension). 
122 See, e.g, Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
123 [d. at 901 ("Implicit in the machine's presence on the market ... was a representation that 
it would safely do the jobs for which it was built . ... To establish the manufacturer's liability it was 
sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was 
intended to be used . ... ") (emphasis added). 
124 See Pressleyv. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 738 F.2d 1222, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 1984) (under Georgia 
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unintended manner, he or she has no legitimate expectation of 
safety.'25 As a result, the consumer, rather than a potential product 
defect, has caused the harm.126 
Fundamentally, the manufacturing defect affects a small percentage 
of litigated cases. 127 As a result, the manufacturer can treat the manu-
facturing defect as an unfortunate aberration or departure-the prod-
uct line, as a whole, remains free from condemnation as being defec-
tive.128 By contrast, design defects condemn the entire product line. 129 
Defectively designed products are constructed and manufactured ac-
cording to the manufacturer's intended specifications; nevertheless, 
the product contains an inherent danger. '3o The defectively designed 
product fails to perform intended functions safely, creates dangerous 
con traindications or side effects, 13l or fails to minimize foreseeable 
injury in the event of accident. 
Unfortunately, classifYing product defects as manufacturing, design 
or marketing defects (defective warnings and instructions) often 
proves a futile and ineffective analytical exercise. Some American cases 
and the European Directive treat warning defects as a type of design 
defect. 132 Warning defects, like design defects, exist in the entire prod-
uct line, while manufacturing or production flaws are atypical. 133 More-
over, design and warning flaws may overlap. For example, a paydozer 
law, there is no liability for failing to equip riding lawn mowers with a deadman switch since 
danger of being hit by the moving blade in fall from the mower is obvious). Cf Micallefv. Miehle 
Co., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y 1976). 
125 See Estrada v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 734 F.2d 1218, 1220 (7th Cir. 1984) (under Indiana law 
where factory worker's hand was injured while brushing ink on rollers, the court stated, " ... go 
to the zoo and put your hand through the bars of the lion's cage, and the lion bites your hand 
off, ... you do not have an action against the zoo"). 
126 See, e.g., Bartkewich v. Billinger, 247 A.2d 603, 605--06 (Pa. 1968). 
127 See, e.g., Ducko v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 639 A.2d 1204, 1205 (Pa. 1994) (circumstantial 
evidence permitted to prove manufacturing defect in automobile). 
128The main manufacturing defect tests, "deviation from the norm" and the "malfunction 
theory" indicate that the defective product is an unfortunate exception to the rest of the product 
line. 
129Because the design defect affects each unit of production, "questions related to 'design 
defects' and the determination of when a product is defective, because of the nature of its design, 
appear to be the most agitated and controversial issues before the courts in the field of products 
liability." Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Mich. 1984). 
130 See generally Henderson,Judicial Review, supra note 2. 
131 See Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 182. 
132 By this, I mean that, in defective warning cases, courts apply negligence concepts in strict 
liability failure to warn cases. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374 (NJ. 1984) 
(prescription drugs). The European Directive accomplishes the same result by employing its 
development defense language. See 1985 European Directive, supra note 7, art. 6(1) (c), 6(2). 
m See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. 
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which lacks rear-view mirrors and back-up warning signals could be 
considered defectively designed, or the redesign could be viewed as 
providing adequate warnings. 134 
Design and production defects also may overlap or coincide. For 
example, a worker is injured when he or she slips on hydraulic fuel 
which has leaked into the operator's compartment of a roof-bolter 
machine. An expert concludes that such leaks are "virtually inevitable," 
but that the injury risk could be eliminated either by installing a floor 
grating or by putting the hydraulic valve outside the operator's com-
partment. 135 In this situation, oil leakage could be viewed as a ran-
dom or atypical manufacturing defect. On the other hand, if such 
leakage is a "virtual inevitability," a design defect involving the entire 
product line exists. 136 Deciding the design defect on a negligence-based 
risk/utility analysis and the manufacturing defect on the consumer 
expectation standard becomes unworkable and doctrinally indefensi-
ble. Applying the consumer expectations test protects the reasonable 
product safety expectations to which such workers are entitled.137 
Consumer expectancy analysis can be useful in many warning situ-
ations as well. An analogy to medical informed consent is illustrative. 
The consumer and the patient both know what warnings are necessary 
for informed safety decision-making, whether in the medical context 
or in the products liability situation. Medical malpractice law can teach 
significant lessons. In the context of informed consent, the law focuses 
on what the patient needs to be told in order to reach the informed 
consent decision. 138 In the products arena, the consumer often knows 
what information he or she needs in order to use the product safely. 139 
The availability of expert testimony may be important in these situ-
ations.140 In the case of prescription drugs, warnings are made directly 
to physicians as learned intermediaries. 141 Courts have recognized that 
134 See Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229, 234 (Cal. 1970). 
135 See Faucett v. Ingersoll-Rand Mining & Mach. Co., 960 F.2d 653, 654 (7th Cir. 1992). 
136 See id. at 655-56. 
137 See, e.g, Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982) (injured worker can 
rely on consumer expectations in a defective design case; if there are none, risk-benefit analysis 
should be employed). 
13R See generally Joseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession: 
The ''Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1213 (1975). 
139 See Hardie, supra note 53. 
140 See Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1459 (10th Cir. 1987) (expert permitted to 
testifY that product was unreasonably dangerous beyond the expectation of the average user). 
141 See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); 
Hill v. Squibb & Sons, E.R., 592 P.2d 1383 (Mont. 1979). 
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expert testimony may be required to explain issues "with respect to 
which laymen can have no knowledge at all. "142 
Some scholars argue that the consumer expectations test is only an 
effective approach for manufacturing or production defects. 143 Clearly, 
the average consumer can understand that a foreign object in food or 
an exploding soda bottle does not meet ordinary safety expectations. 
On the other hand, many scholars argue that the consumer expecta-
tions test may not be useful in warning cases. 144 However, this argumen t 
may take too limited a view of consumer capabilities. 
Basically, the consumer expectations test asks whether the product'S 
safety conforms to what a reasonable consumer expects.145 If the prod-
uct does not so conform, it is defective. 146 Scholars recognize a number 
of problems with this test. 147 They argue that consumer expectations 
may be too high, too low or even non-existent because the consumer 
is particularly cynical, knowledgeable, or risk-averse.148 These criticisms 
may focus too much on idiosyncratic or subjective consumer knowl-
edge, rather than on what the reasonable consumer understands and 
expects. Obvious dangers present the archetypical situation. For exam-
ple, because a punch press without a safety device presents an obvious 
danger to the consumer, it might be considered non-defective. Never-
theless, a consumer may be entitled to expect a product to be safe even 
if, as currently designed, it contains an obvious flaw. 149 
Similarly, the argument that the consumer can have no expectation 
of product safety with respect to obvious danger is misplaced. A con-
sumer can expect product safety even when exposed to obvious dan-
ger. 150 By analogy, obvious workplace dangers which are known to the 
employee are nonetheless actionable under federal and state labor 
laws. 151 If a product meets government safety standards, this could 
142 Hill, 592 P.2d at 1388 (quoting Callahan v. Burton, 487 P.2d 515,518 (Mont. 1971)). 
143 See Henderson & Twerski, A Proposed Revision, supra note 3, at 1532-34. 
144 See id. 
145 See, e.g., Vinces v. Esther Williams-All Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794 (Wis. 
1975). 
146 See Fischer, supra note 1, at 348. 
147 See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Liability, 39 WAYNE 
L. REv. 1217 (1993) [hereinafter Davis, Design Defect Liability]. 
148 See Kennedy, supra note 33, at 143-44. 
149 See Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUMBo L. REv. 
293,305-06 (1979). 
150 See, e.g., Micallefv. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y 1976). 
151 See The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994). 
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provide evidence of safety expectations to which the consumer is enti-
tled. 152 
At the other extreme, scholars argue that consumers cannot have 
expectations about products involving complicated design issues. 153 
Requiring expert testimony can overcome these problems even in 
complicated design situations. Juries often benefit from expert testi-
mony in modern civil and criminal litigation. Expert testimony should 
be used as readily in products liability cases as in manufacturing defect 
cases. 154 
Some scholars argue that the consumer-oriented test requires some 
risk/utility balancing because courts must still determine whether such 
expectations are reasonable. 155 Nevertheless, the essence of the con-
sumer expectations test is whether the product would be merchantable 
if the market knew of the danger. Significant policy considerations 
support retention of the consumer-oriented test. If risk/utility analysis 
is viewed as essentially identical to the theory of unreasonableness of 
risk in negligence law, strict liability is thwarted. To the extent that this 
is true, strict liability "failure to warn" cases also become indistinguish-
able from negligence cases. 
A major controversy in American products liability centers on mis-
use, especially the question of whether misuse should be an affirmative 
defense or part of the plaintiffs prima facie case. 156 A cogent applica-
tion of the consumer expectations test requires that it be an affirma-
tive defense. Misuse consists of two components: plaintiff conduct and 
manufacturer foreseeability of such conduct. 157 In negligence actions, 
the plaintiff bears burdens of production and persuasion regarding 
defendant conduct, while the defendant carries these burdens for 
plaintiff conduct. 15s Strict products liability actions should be less bur-
densome for the plaintiff than traditional negligence. Requiring the 
plaintiff to establish the absence of misuse is burdensome, inconsistent 
152 See, e.g., Miller v. Lee Apparel Co., 881 P.2d 576, 587 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (product 
complying with federal flammability standards). 
153 See Davis, Design Defect Liamlity, supra note 147, at 1236-37. 
154 See, e.g., Nadine E. Roddy, Expert Testimony on the Adequacy of a Product's Warning: Recent 
Cases, 12 PROD. LIAB. TRENDS 109 (Oct. 1987). 
155 See Kennedy, supra note 33, at 139-42. 
156 See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 352-56 (Md. 1985) (treating misuse 
as part of plaintiffs case). 
157 See Aaron D. Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of 
Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REv. 403, 420-21 (1978). 
158 See id. at 426. 
248 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XX, No.2 
and counterproductive. Therefore, plaintiff misuse should be an affir-
mative defense. 
The main argument against this position is that intended use, the 
opposite of misuse, is part of the plaintiffs prima facie case. 159 As a 
result, the plaintiff must establish that the product is defective when 
used in the intended and/or foreseeable manner. 160 From this perspec-
tive, misuse becomes an issue of proximate cause. Since proximate 
cause is part of the plaintiffs burden of proof, by logical extension, 
misuse becomes part of the plaintiffs burden as well,l61 
A similar result is reached by decisions which focus on misuse in the 
context of causation in fact. 162 In this analysis, misuse becomes a super-
seding cause of injury. This concept is exemplified by the case of 
Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc. 163 The plaintiff wore a flammable night-
gown inside out with two side pockets flapping and protruding. After 
placing a kettle on the burner of her stove, plaintiff turned on the 
burner. She reached above the stove to get a coffee filter from the 
cupboard, causing one of the protruding pockets to contact the 
burner, igniting her gown. The Court of Appeals of Maryland con-
cluded that intended use constituted part of the plaintiffs prima facie 
case. l64 
III. THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE AND LITIGATION REALITIES 
The European Directive seeks to promote integration of Member 
State markets by providing a uniform standard of product liability 
safety: strict liability. 165 Although the European Directive mandates that 
strict liability form the basis for producer (manufacturer) liability, it is 
unlikely that this will result in the development of products liability law 
similar to the American experience. Most EU Member States are civil 
law countries, without a strong tradition of case law creating substantial 
legal change.166 Even in common law jurisdictions such as Ireland and 
159 See Ellsworth, 495 A.2d at 355. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 355-56. 
162See, e.g., McCormick v. Custom Pools, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Minn. App. 1985) ("a 
warning would not have deterred McCormick from diving since a warning would have merely 
informed him of risks of which he was already aware."). 
163 Ellsworth, 495 A.2d at 348. 
lfi4 See id. at 356. 
165 1985 European Directive, supra note 7, pmbl. 
166 See Patrick Thieffrey et aI., Strict Product Liability in the EEC: Implementation Practice and 
Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 TORT & INS. LJ. 65, 66-67 (1989). 
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England, legislation holds the primary position over case law. 167 More-
over, European litigants face disincentives to litigation, including the 
cost of retaining counsel in light of the prohibition of contingent 
fees. 168 Most significantly, juries will not decide product liability dis-
putes. 169 As a result, the development of strict product liability will have 
a uniquely European perspective. European adoption of strict liability 
for defective products need not result in an American-style litigation 
explosion. 170 
CONCLUSION 
The abandonment of the consumer expectations test may be short-
sighted and imprudent. Although it has become commonplace to 
criticize the consumer expectations test, these critiques apparently 
ignore the fact that a central and paramount purpose of products 
liability law is the protection of legitimate consumer safety expecta-
tions. Encouraging product development and innovation merits atten-
tion. However, such innovation neither compels nor should compel a 
move to a manufacturer-oriented negligence standard which defeats 
legitimate, bargained-for consumer expectations. These legitimate 
products liability goals are promoted by the European Directive. 
167 See id. at 90-91. 
168 See generally Stapleton, supra note 7. Similar procedural limitations mean that other coun-
tries moving towards strict products liability do not anticipate a litigation explosion. See, e.g., Mark 
A Behrnes & Daniel H. Raddock, Japan's New Product Liability Law: The Citadel of Strict Liability 
Falls, but Access to Recovery is Limited by Formidable Barriers, 16 U. PA.]. INT'L. Bus. L. 669 (1995); 
Hiroshi Sarumida, Comparative Institutional Analysis of Product Safety Systems in the United States 
and Japan: Alternative Approaches to Create Incentives for Product Safety, 29 CORNELL INT'L. LJ. 79 
(1996); Bruce A. Thomas et aI., Product Liability and Innovation: A Canadian Perspective, 21 
CAN.- U.S. LJ. 313 (1995). 
169 See TEBBENS, supra note 38, at 153-54. 
l70The 1970s and 1980s saw much discussion of a products liability crisis. See, e.g., Stephanie 
Goldberg, Manufacturers Take Cover, 72 ABA ]., July 1, 1986, at 52; Bernard Wysocki, Jr., 
Litigation Load: Case of the $154,100 Finger, WALL ST.]., June 3, 1975, at I. This "explosion" 
resulted in considerable reform. See, e.g., Melvin Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the 
First Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731 (1992); Martha Middleton, A Changing 
Landscape-As Congress Struggles to Rewrite the Nation's Tort Laws, the States Already May Have 
Done theJob, 81 ABA]., Aug. 1995, at 56; Messagefrom the Chair, ABA TIPS NEWSLETTER (ABA, 
Chicago, II.), Spring/Summer 1995. 
